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Abstract
Aharonov and Albert analyze a thought experiment which they believe
shows that quantum mechanical state reductions occur along temporal
hypersurfaces in Minkowski space. They conclude that the covariant state
reduction theory of Hellwig and Kraus does not apply. In Part I of this
paper we disagree with this interpretation of the A-A experiment, and
show the adequacy of the H-K theory. In Part II we examine the belief
that H-K reductions produce self contradicting causal loops, and/or give
rise to absurd boundary conditions. These objections to the theory are
shown to be unfounded.
PACS 03.65 - Quantum mechanics
PACS 03.65.Bz - Foundations, theory of measurement
1 Introduction
When the position of a quantum mechanical particle is measured, its state
undergoes a collapse that is instantaneous and universal. If that were not so,
there would be a finite probability of finding the particle in two different places
at once. The collapse must furthermore be such that the particle cannot be
simultaneously found at two different places relative to any Lorentz observer.
It follows that state reduction for a position measurement must be effective
throughout the entire space-like region surrounding the measurement. This
illustrates the Hellwig-Kraus reduction thesis which claims more generally that
any measurement reduces the state in all of the surrounding space-like region
[1]. Accordingly, state reduction is felt all along the surface of the backward
time cone, and at all events forward of that surface.
Several authors believe that there exist special measurements that do not
result in a Hellwig-Kraus type of reduction [2],[3],[4]. The reductions associated
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with these measurements are said to occur across hypersurfaces of time, in
violation of the covariant H-K reduction scheme. The prototype of this kind
of measurement is given in a thought experiment proposed by Aharonov and
Albert in Ref. 2.
Part I
2 The Aharonov & Albert experment
Two spatially separated 1/2 spin particles are initially prepared in the state
|0, 0〉 = |Jz = 0, J2 = 0〉 = 1√
2
{| ↑〉1| ↓〉2 − | ↓〉1| ↑〉2} (1)
The first particle is made to interact with a detector at point x1, and the sec-
ond particle is made to interact with another detector at point x2 6= x1, where
the interactions are simultaneous in some Lorentz Frame. Prior to these inter-
actions, the detectors are brought together for the purpose of correlating their
internal variables in a specific way. After the interactions, Aharonov & Albert
show that neither one of the detectors has measured a single spin component of
either particle by itself. Instead, the detectors have together recorded the fact
that the particles continue to be in the state |0, 0〉. On this basis, A&A claim
to have designed “. . . a system of purely local experiments which measures a
nonlocal property of the system at a well defined time. . . ”(Ref. 2, p.363). That
is true so long as “measures” refers only to a measurement interaction, and
does not include the observation that the author believes is necessary to pro-
duce the state reduction associated with measurement. A&A do not make this
distinction. They focus entirely on the interaction as though it is sufficient to
bring about a state reduction. They conclude that this particular reduction
takes place across a (flat) hypersurface of time, which means that the covariant
(cone-shaped) reduction of Hellwig and Kraus cannot apply.
The author believes that a proper analysis of any state reduction must in-
clude an account of all detector observations as well as their interactions. Any
observation is intrinsically local, and is said by von Neumann to trigger a mea-
surement process that he calls Process I (see Sect. 5). It is claimed here that
any such measurement will sharply locate the vertex of a Hellwig-Kraus (cone
shaped) reduction at the observation site; and therefore, that the A&A experi-
ment does not result in (flat) temporal hypersurface reductions.
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3 Nonlocal nondemolition
Consider the case shown in Fig. 1 in which one of the detector-particle inter-
actions (event 1) takes place before the other (event 2) in some Lorentz frame.
The world lines of particles #1 and #2 are parallel to each other and to the
t-axis, where the particles together occupy the state |0, 0〉. The two detectors
(the square boxes) are initially brought together at event I in order to prepare
their variables as specified in A&A (Ref. 2, Eqs. 13, 18). The detectors then
separate for the purpose of interacting with the particles at the space-like events
1 and 2. After these interactions, the detectors turn back to reunite with one
another at event M so their variables can be jointly compared. The last step is
not discussed by A&A, yet joint comparison is essential. Prior to this reunion
the separate detector variables are indefinite, which is why neither detector by
itself can measure the spin state of either particle. However, the detectors are
correlated by the initial preparation in such a way that their combined values
are definite (Ref. 2, p. 362-3). This combined definiteness applies before event
1, and again after event 2 in the Lorentz frame of Fig. 1. It is this that al-
lows an observer at event M to make a definite measurement on the combined
apparatus, confirming that the particles remain in the state |0, 0〉. Aharonov
and Albert call this a nonlocal nondemolition experiment because it measures
a nonlocal state without destroying it.
Of course, it is not necessary to being the detectors together if the informa-
tion can be communicated to eventM by some other means. It is only necessary
to insure that such information is correctly combined prior to an observation.
The detector’s combined variables will be correlated any time before event
1 and after event 2 as has been said. But A&A show that this correlation
is destroyed at any time between events 1 and 2. Between these events they
say, ”. . . the full state will not be separable into a state of the two-particle
system and a state of the measuring apparatus . . .” (Ref. 2, p.364). The
interaction at event 1 therefore disturbs the system in such a way as to entangle
the particle and detector states in Hilbert space, and this disturbance is rectified
by the interaction at event 2. In a Lorentz frame in which events 1 and 2 are
simultaneous, this disturbance does not occur.
4 Sequential cycles
We now subject each detector to two interactions (see Fig. 2), where each detec-
tor moves along with, and remains close to, the particle that it monitors. The
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Figure 1:
first detector on the left makes contact with particle #1 (not shown) at events
1 and 3, and the second detector on the right makes contact with particle #2
(not shown) at events 2 and 4. Both events on the right are assumed to have a
space-like relationship to both events on the left.
These detectors have been initially prepared at an event such as I in Fig. 1,
but in this case they are not reunited for the purpose of measurement. Instead,
a measurement is affected by communicating information about the detector’s
variables to a common event like M by other means. This information can be
taken from any pair of events along the world lines of the detectors, such as
events a and v, or b and u. We will say that the detectors have been compared
at events m and n when information from these two events has been brought
together at the common event for comparison. This comparison will not by itself
produce a state reduction. We will say that the detectors have been observed at
events m and n when the comparison at those two events has been externally
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“observed” at the common event. This observation will result in a reduction
that is reflected back along the surface of the backward time cone of the common
event (through nonlocal correlations) to the detectors and the particles. These
are reduced when their world lines penetrate the surface of the backward time
cone of the common event, as prescribed by Hellwig and Kraus.
As previously stated, when the detectors are compared at events a and u
or b and v, their combined variables will be definite and they will register the
fact that the particles occupy the state |0, 0〉. If, additionally, the detectors
are observed at events a and u or b and v, then the particle state |0, 0〉 will be
empirically verified and will be identically reduced.
We also learned in the previous section that if the detectors are compared
at events b and u, their combined variables will be indefinite. This reflects the
fact that the system is disrupted after event 1 and before event 2. Therefore,
an observation of detectors at events b and u will be accompanied by a state
reduction that decouples the particles. Such an observation is irreversible. It
will disrupt the system in a way that event 2 cannot restore.
If the system survives events 1 and 2 without a disruptive observation, we
will have completed a nondemolition cycle. Events 3 and 4, complete another
nondemolition cycle. This cycle can be repeated many times so long as there is
no permanent disruption of the system due to an observation of the detectors
at events such as b and u, or d and w.
Since nothing happens to alter the states between event w and v (project-
ing backward in time), the particle and detector states at events d and v are
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also non-separable in Hilbert space. This means that when the detectors are
compared at events d and v, their combined variables will be indefinite. And if
the detectors are observed at events d and v, the resulting irreversible reduction
will permanently disrupt the system, destroying the state |0, 0〉 by decoupling
the particles from one another. This, we say, happens because the pair of events
3 and 2 is demolitional.
If Fig. 2 is Lorentz transformed in such a way as to make event 2 occur
before event 1, then by a similar reasoning the combined variables at events
b and z will also be indefinite. Therefore, events 1 and 4 are demolitional as
well. It appears that observations of either of the cross pairs 1 and 4, or 3 and
2, will irreversibly disrupt the particle state, whereas parallel pair observations
will not. This conclusion is Lorentz invariant.
All of the above assumes that the detectors are correctly prepared at event
I. With a different initial preparation of the detectors, Aharonov and Albert
show that events 3 and 2 can be made to be nondemolitional, and event 1 and
2 would then be demolitional. In this case, the change in initial preparation is
one that would cause detector #1 to emerge from event 1 in such a way that a
comparison of the combined variables (after 1 and before 2) would be definite.
Aharonov and Albert draw a different conclusion from sequential experi-
ments like those in Fig. 2. For them, the parallel event pairs 1-2, and 3-4
constitute complete nondemolition cycles that automatically include state re-
duction, and this is supposedly achieved without having to introduce an external
observer (Ref. 2, p. 365). They also say that the cross event pairs 3-2, and
1-4, are complete cycles (again, including state reduction without the benefit
of an observer), but this time the result is demolitional. As a result, we have
the odd situation that the four unobserved events in Fig. 2 are said to leave
the system in the original state |0, 0〉, and at the same time, they are said to
leave it irreversibly reduced in a disrupted state. A&A accept this result at
face value, allowing all such conflicting state reductions to be realized. They
formalize the apparent contradiction by representing reduced states as surface
functionals, thereby allowing the different reductions to apply along different
temporal hypersurfaces. This can be done in such a way as to preserve Lorentz
invariance, which otherwise appears to be lost [5].
In this paper we say that competing reductions are not equally realized.
A realized reduction will be either demolitional or nondemolitional, and the
one that actually occurs depends on which events are witnessed by an outside
observer.
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5 Two processes
John von Neumann’s theory of measurement introduces a special non-Schro¨dinger
process, which he calls Process I, that describes the collapse of the state func-
tion under measurement. It changes a pure quantum mechanical state into a
classical mixture. The standard Schro¨dinger evolution, which he calls Process
II, can only change pure states into pure states [6].
If the detectors in Fig. 2 are not observed, they will evolve under Schro¨dinger
(von Neumann’s Process II) causing their joint variables to vary back and forth
between definite and indefinite values. This would produce no paradox, no
irreversible reduction, and no difficulty with the ordinary meaning of Lorentz
invariance.
We have seen in the previous section that detector information must be
brought to a common location for external examination. It is here that we
make the observation that initiates von Neumann’s Process I, and locates the
vertex of a Hellwig-Kraus reduction at the observation site. Since we decide
when and where we are going to make an observation, we are the ones who
decide whether the associated reduction will preserve, or permanently destroy
the particle state. We can choose to observe events 1 and 2, or 3 and 4, and
preserve the state |0, 0〉; or we can choose to observe events 3 and 2, or 1 and
4, and irreversibly destroy the state.
Choosing when to measure a quantum mechanical system is identical with
deciding when to impose additional boundary conditions. It opens a closed sys-
tem to further conditionals. It is difficult for many physicists to believe that
there exists an independent process that competes with Schro¨dinger at such
a fundamental level, but this is the implication of von Neumann’s theory of
measurement. Von Neumann showed that the boundary between a quantum
mechanical system and a measuring device is arbitrary. However, there must
always be a boundary, and there is always something on the observer side of that
boundary that cannot be included in the system1. If everything were includable,
then the wider system would be entirely Schro¨dinger driven. It would then be
unable to undergo a state reduction2. Therefore, something that is intrinsically
outside the system gives rise to state reduction. Von Neumann himself believed
this “something” to be related to the existence of consciousness, as have several
others [8][9][10] including the author [11][12]. But however consciousness may or
1This boundary has nothing to do with the microscopic/macroscopic distinction. According
to von Neumann, a macroscopic measuring device can always be included inside of a quantum
mechanical system.
2This statement precludes solutions of the type proposed by Ghiradi et al [7]
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may not enter into the picture, reduction represents a boundary making ability
of the quantum mechanical observer that cannot be set aside. These bound-
aries are an essential part of quantum epistemology inasmuch as a quantum
mechanical universe without definite boundaries is alien to human experience.
We humans are constrained to deal with classical reality at the boundary of
a quantum reality, and are therefore limited to a theory that deals with finite
quantum mechanical systems that exist outside of ourselves. Heisenberg writes,
“. . . it is important to remember that in natural science we are not interested
in the universe as a whole, including ourselves, but we direct our attention to
some part of the universe and make that the object of our studies” [13]. There
is something about ourselves, as quantum mechanical observers, that places us
firmly outside of the Schro¨dinger-driven world of quantum mechanics. When
this distinctive role of the observer is taken into account, a la von Neumann,
the Aharonov and Albert experiment is found to be fully consistent with the
covariant reduction theory of Hellwig and Kraus.
Part II
6 Causal loops
Some find a Hellwig-Kraus reduction disturbing in the way that it projects its
influence backward in time (relative to a given Lorentz frame), thereby raising
the prospect of a self contradictory causal loop (Ref. 3, p.1696).
Imagine that the spin of the two particles in the state |0, 0〉 are observed
by two different (and separated) observers, where there is now no attempt to
preserve the state as in Part I. Suppose the first particle is observed at event
A in Fig. 3, and is found to have a positive spin. Because of correlations, the
second particle at event B will then be found to have a negative spin.
Neither particle can be found in the twice reduced region III, for otherwise
there would be a Lorentz frame in which one of the particles would be found
in two different places at once. This means that the reduced state of event A
is confined to the space-like region around event A that overlaps the backward
time cone of event B (labeled region II in Fig. 3). Similarly, the reduced state
of event B is confined to region I in Fig. 3. We ignore what happens in the
forward time cones of events A and B.
We can find the unrenormalized reduced state of event A by operating on
|0, 0〉 in Eq. 1 with 〈↑ |1, the measured spin of the first particle at A.
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III
III
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event A
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↑
2
1
2
0, 0
Figure 3:
〈↑ |1|0, 0〉 = 1√
2
| ↓〉2 (2)
This reduced single particle ket occupies the immediate backward time cone of
event B as shown in region II of Fig. 3. It tells us that the observation at event
A leaves only one spin possibility at event B.3 When the second particle is
subsequently observed at B, the result is
〈↑ |1〈↓ |2|0, 0〉 = 1√
2
(3)
whose square magnitude is 0.5, the joint probability of finding the first particle
with spin up, and the second particle with spin down. The reduced state of
event B (shown in region I) can be found in a similar way.
What may be disturbing about this theory is that the reduced state in the
immediate backward time cone of event B in Fig. 3 is a function of what happens
at event A. If the observer at A decides to look at his apparatus, that decision
clearly influences the form of the reduced state leading into event B. One might
therefore suppose that observer A could send a superluminal message to observer
B by deciding not to look. But that will not work. When B records a negative
spin, he does not know if that happens because he is looking at the original
state |0, 0〉 and just happens to measure ‘spin down’, or because he is looking
at the reduced state of event A which makes ‘spin down’ the only possibility at
3von Neumann’s non-relativistic Process I for this particular renormalized reduction gives
the state | ↑〉1| ↓〉2 that exists any time after event A and before event B in the Lorentz frame
of Fig. 3. This is compatible with the relativistic H-K result if we let | ↑〉1 be limited to the
future time cone of event A, and let | ↓〉2 be limited to the backward time cone of event B.
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event B. Therefore, A’s decision to observe, or not, cannot send a decipherable
message to observer B.
Although observer A can choose to make an observation, he cannot choose
the outcome; and so, he cannot choose B’s outcome either. He can no more
sent a message to B than he can send one to himself by this means. The fact
that B’s outcome depends on A’s outcome is called outcome dependence, and
the fact that B’s result is independent of A’s decision to make an observation is
called parameter independence (Ref. 4, Sect. 8.2).
An ensemble of experiments of this kind is also unable to communicate
superluminally. The observer at event A can only record the probability of
finding ‘spin up’, and he will get 0.5 no matter what the observer at event B
does or experiences. In order to confirm that the joint probability is 0.5 for the
(↑, ↓) spin combination, it will be necessary for observers A and B to get together
(at some later time) to compare notes - to verify correlations. Superluminal
communication is then no longer a consideration.
7 Non-local Boundaries
There is still another objection that is raised in connection with the reduction
scheme in Fig. 3. The two observations at events A and B in that figure are a
pair of boundary conditions that are placed on the original state |0, 0〉. However,
neither one is anywhere near the boundary of that function. They are both
some distance away from the shaded area in Fig. 3 over which they have joint
jurisdiction. Cohen & Hiley comment on this consequence of the Hellwig-Kraus
theory saying, “. . . the two-particle wave function is reduced before either
particle has been subjected to a measurement, which seems absurd” (Ref. 3, p.
1695). The author disagrees.
We know that the correlations found in this two particle spin system act
nonlocally through distance. There is nothing absurd about that, or at least,
there is nothing new about that since the discovery of Bell’s inequalities [14].
Certainly these correlations can be nonlocal through time as well as distance in
any Lorentz frame - so long as they do not extend into the backward time cone
of a given measurement. There is therefore no reason why the joint events A
and B in Fig. 3 should not be the terminal boundary conditions of the shaded
area in that figure, as well as the initial conditions of the reductions in regions
I and II.
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